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Code Sections Affected.
Labor Code §§ 2698, 2699 (new).
SB 796 (Dunn); 2003 STAT. Ch. 906.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last thirty years, the growth of California's businesses has far
outstripped the state's capacity to enforce its Labor Code.' Illustrative of the
effects of this growing discrepancy is the state of the Department of Industrial
Relations, which is charged with "enforcing the state's minimum wage,
prevailing wage, child labor, employment discrimination, working conditions,
and overtime laws."2
While the number of employers and employees in California has more than
doubled since 1970,' the amount of staff available to enforce the Labor Code has
not kept pace.4 Since 1980, staff at the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
("DLSE") and California Occupational Safety and Health Association, two of the
enforcement arms of the Department of Industrial Relations, decreased by 7.6%
and 10.8%, respectively.5 More recently, two executive orders eliminated 270
vacant positions from the Department of Industrial Relations.6 As a result of the
decreased staff available, inspections, citations, and penalties pursuant to the
Labor Code diminished despite the contemporaneous growth in California's
7
economy.
1. See generally TOM GALLAGHER, TOUGH ON CRIME? THE DECLINE OF LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
CALIFORNIA 1970-2000 (June 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting employment
statistics in California over the last thirty years and comparing them to declines in enforcement staffing).
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id, at 7-9 (indicating that the number of employees in the state has increased 114% since 1970, while
the number of employers has grown by 122% since 1970).
4. Id. at 7 (indicating that employees in the enforcement division of the Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement decreased 8.9 percent relative to increases in employees and employers).
5. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 4
(July 9, 2003) (citing a recent study on labor law enforcement in California).
6. See E-mail from Patrick W. Henning, Staff Director, Senate Labor and Industrial Relations
Committee, to Elena Lopez-Guzman, Consultant, Senator Joseph Dunn (July 17, 2003) [hereinafter Henning E-
mail] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the effects of Executive Orders D70-03 and 71-03
on vacant positions within the Department of Industrial Relations).
7. See GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at 5, 13 (showing that investigations, citations and penalties have
declined).
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A 2001 study indicated that the DLSE inspected 981 restaurants for various
labor violations in 1998-1999.8 At that pace it would take over 100 years to
inspect each of California's restaurants, despite restaurants being a targeted
industry of the DLSE.9
Further evidence of inadequate inspections and citations exists in Los
Angeles's garment industry where a study of the garment industry in Los
Angeles indicated that despite 33,000 "serious and ongoing" wage violations, the
Department of Industrial Relations issued fewer than one hundred wage citations
per year throughout the entire state for all industries combined.'" In all, citations
issued by the Bureau of Field Enforcement ("BOFE") have diminished by
46.4%," while "the amount of wages that BOFE has recovered for workers also




In the wake of these statistics, the Legislature made findings that while
adequate financing was required to ensure maximum compliance with the Labor
Code, "staffing levels for state labor law enforcement agencies have, in general,
declined over the last decade and are likely to fail to keep up with the growth of
the labor market in the future."' 3 In essence, the Legislature found that it needed
funding to hire enforcement staff but that no funding was available. To address
this problem, the Legislature enacted Chapter 906 which effectively hired more
than 17 million labor law watchdogs without spending a single dollar. 4
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prior to Chapter 906, violations of California's Labor Code were punishable
as misdemeanors, by civil penalty, or both." Enforcement of most of these
provisions came under the purview of the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency,' 6 which is composed of the Department of Industrial Relations, the
Employment Development Department, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board,
8. Id. atll.
9. Id.
10. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 3 (July
9, 2003) (citing a U.S. Department of Labor study of the Los Angeles garment industry).
11. GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at 12.
12. Id. at 12.
13. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 3 (July
9, 2003).
14. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698-2699 (enacted by Chapter 906) (authorizing an aggrieved employee to
bring private civil suits).
15. See Letter from Mark S. Schacht, Deputy Director, Law Offices of California Rural Legal
Assistance Foundation, to Senator Richard Alarcon, Chairman, Labor and Industrial Relations Committee,
Addendum (Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Schacht Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing
each Labor Code section punishable as misdemeanors, by civil penalty, or both).
16. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 1 (Apr. 29, 2003).
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and the Workforce Investment Board. 7 These four entities were authorized to
assess and collect civil penalties for specified violations of the Labor Code"8
while various public prosecutors were empowered to pursue misdemeanor
charges against violators of Labor Code sections.'9
An aggrieved employee, however, was restricted under the Labor Code to
filing a traditional suit for damages or, where damages were difficult to prove,
specified "statutory damages."2
III. CHAPTER 906
Known as the "Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004,' '2I
Chapter 906 is intended to address inadequacies of labor law enforcement in two
ways: (1) authorizing aggrieved employees acting as private attorney generals to
file actions to recover civil penalties;22 and (2) attaching nominal civil fine
amounts to many Labor Code violations which previously carried only criminal
penalties .23
Under this new statutory scheme, an aggrieved employee can bring an action
against an employer for $100 per pay period for an initial violation, and $200 for
each subsequent violation. Any civil penalty recovered pursuant to the action is
to be distributed "fifty percent to the General Fund, twenty-five percent to the
Labor and Workforce Development Agency for education of employers and
employees about their rights and responsibilities under [the Labor Code]," and
"twenty-five percent to the aggrieved employees. 25 If the violator does not have
any employees at the time of the violation, the civil penalty is $500,26 and any
penalty collected is to be distributed 50% to the General Fund and 50% to the
Labor and Workforce Development Agency.27
17. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 2 (June 26, 2003).
18. CAL. LAB. CODE § 210 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004) (prescribing civil penalties for specified labor
law violations to be paid into the State Treasury to the credit of the General Fund and for educating employers
about California's Labor Law); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 2
(June 26, 2003).
19. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 215, 218 (West 2003) (authorizing public prosecutors of counties and cities,
inter alia, to pursue misdemeanor charges for specified violations of the Labor Code).
20. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 1 (July
9, 2003); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 2 (June 26, 2003).
21. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2698 (enacted by Chapter 906).
22. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a).
23. Id. § 2699(e)(1)-(2) (assigning a civil penalty to all violations of the Labor Code which did not
formerly have one).
24. Id. § 2699(e)(2).
25. Id. § 2699(h).
26. Id. § 2699(e)(1).
27. Id. § 2699(i).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
A. Adequacy and Effect of the New Statutory Scheme
Faced with a budgetary shortfall28 and a growing underground economy,29
California could not afford to enforce compliance with its Labor Code prior to
the enactment of Chapter 906.'0 Already insufficient staffs were being further
depleted by cutbacks3' while the number of employees in California continued to1 2
increase. Essentially, the climate called for a creative solution to a problem that
would otherwise continue to grow."
By authorizing aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys general and to
file actions to recover civil penalties,34 Chapter 906 overcomes the core problem
with Labor Code enforcement: lack of manpower.35 Rather than remaining stifled
by budget constraints and hopeful that the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency could eventually hire enough staff to enforce the Labor Code, Chapter
906 effectively deputizes California's more than 17 million workers to enforce
the Labor Code themselves.36 In fact, supporters of Chapter 906 argue that not
only does the new statutory scheme have no negative impact on the state's
General Fund,37 it will actually raise additional revenue because more actions will
be brought, resulting in more fines.
Further, by attaching nominal civil fine amounts to all Labor Code violations
which previously carried only criminal penalties, the Legislature ensured that
these provisions will be enforced with the same regularity as the provisions that
do not require criminal prosecutions.39 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 906,
28. See John M. Broder, California Turmoil: Budget Talks Stall Recall Drive Gains, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 2003, at A l (describing the state's $38 billion budget deficit).
29. See ASSEMBLY COMMrlTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMrIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 3
(July 9, 2003) (estimating that businesses operating outside the state's tax and licensing requirements earned
between $60 and $140 billion per year); GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting an estimate that California
loses $2-3 billion annually as a result of unreported wages and various other underground activities).
30. See Letter from Tom Rankin, President, California Labor Federation, to Assemblymember Ellen
Corbett, Chairperson, Assembly Judiciary Committee (June 25, 2003) [hereinafter Rankin Letter] (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (attributing inadequate enforcement of the Labor Code to budget constraints).
31. See Henning E-mail, supra note 6 (describing the effects of Executive Orders D70-03 and 71-03 on
vacant positions within the Department of Industrial Relations).
32. GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at 7.
33. See Rankin Letter, supra note 30 (calling for a "creative solution" to aid in the enforcement of the
Labor Code).
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (enacted by Chapter 906).
35. See Rankin Letter, supra note 30 (attributing the state's inability to enforce existing labor laws to
inadequate staffing).
36. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (enacted by Chapter 906) (creating a rights of action for "aggrieved
employees"); GALLAGHER, supra note 1, at 7 (reporting that in 2000 California had more than 16 million
employees).
37. Schacht Letter, supra note 15.
38. Rankin Letter, supra note 30.
39. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e) (enacted by Chapter 906) (assigning a civil penalty to all violations
of the Labor Code which did not formerly have one).
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violations that were only enforceable as misdemeanors were largely neglected by
the prosecutors who had the sole jurisdiction to enforce the Code.4 0 By
augmenting these provisions with civil fines that are enforceable by aggrieved
employees, the Legislature increased the likelihood that these provisions will be
enforced.4'
Opponents, however, contend that the evidence submitted in support of
reconstructing the statutory scheme failed to adequately justify Chapter 906.2
Further, opponents argue that Chapter 906 adds to an already unfriendly business
climate in the state by encouraging suits against employers. 3
B. Comparisons to Business and Professions Code Sections 17200-17209
The most significant criticism of Chapter 906 has been its similarity to Business
and Professions Code sections 17200-1720944 which allows any person acting for the
interests of himself or the general public to bring an action for a violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law. Critics argue that this "private attorney
general" provision of the Business and Professions Code has led to allegations of
rampant abuse by the bar" and "lends itself to a shakedown.
47
40. See ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 4
(July 9, 2003) (relaying the argument of Chapter 906's author that district attorneys largely neglect criminal
misdemeanor prosecutions of Labor Code provisions, instead dedicating their resources to other public
priorities).
41. See id. (arguing that many district attorneys tend to direct their resources at violent crimes at the
expense of litigating Labor Law violations that are punishable only as misdemeanors).
42. See Letter from Julianne Broyles, Director, Employee Relations and Small Business for the
California Chamber of Commerce, to Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee (June 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Broyles Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that supporters of Chapter 906
have not provided any evidence to indicate that the state's enforcement of the Labor Code was inadequate);
Letter from Michael Prosio, Legislative Director, California Restaurant Association, to Ellen Corbett,
Chairperson, Assembly Judiciary Committee (June 18, 2003) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(indicating that there was "no apparent need to bypass the current system"); see also Letter from Brian Maas,
Government and Legal Affairs Counsel, California Motor Car Dealers Association, to Assemblymember Ellen
Corbett, Chairperson, Assembly Judiciary Committee (June 20, 2003) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(arguing in part that Chapter 906 "puts the proverbial cart before the horse" by enacting this new statutory
scheme before an independent research organization submits an assembly-mandated study on both "the most
effective and efficient means of enforcing wage and hour laws," and the available federal and state resources to
enforce the same).
43. See Broyles Letter, supra note 42 (arguing that prevailing employers' inability to recover attorney
fees and costs under Chapter 906 will contribute to the state's "less-than-employer-friendly atmosphere").
44. See e.g., id. (arguing that the private attorney general provisions will lead to meritless lawsuits);
Letter from Prem Hunji Turner, Legislative Counsel, California Employment Law Council, to Members of the
Senate Labor and Industrial Relations Committee (Mar. 25, 2003) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(arguing that the private attorney general provisions of Chapter 906 remove prosecutorial discretion in bringing
actions pursuant to the Labor Code, and thus open the door to lawsuits over minor and technical violations).
45. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 17200-17209 (West 2003).
46. ASSEMBLY COMMPITEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMrITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 5 (July
9, 2003).
47. See Rob Garver, Class-Action Arbitration: Next Big Litigation Thing?, AM. BANKER, June 11, 2003,
at 4A (quoting a Los Angeles attorney).
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Illustrative of this criticism is the case of the Trevor Law Group in Beverly
Hills. 8 The Group's three attorneys were alleged to have created a shell
corporation to serve as plaintiff in suits filed against thousands of small
businesses pursuant to the "private attorney general" provisions of Business and
Professions Code sections 17200-17209. '9 The attorneys then reportedly lied to
and threatened defendants in order to leverage settlements before the matters
went to court. °
Opponents of Chapter 906 fear that the private attorney general provisions
will lead to the same abuses and spawn a cottage industry of bounty hunting
litigation against California's employers.5' As a corollary, opponents argue that
these lawsuits will further "clog the already overburdened" court system.52
Supporters of Chapter 906, however, offer a number of reasons why such
fears are misplaced. 3 First, unlike Business and Professions Code sections
17200-17209, Chapter 906 does not allow a person who did not suffer a harm to
bring an action. 4 Instead, only an aggrieved employee can bring an action
pursuant to Chapter 906." Second, the civil penalties are relatively low 5 6 and the
majority of the fines collected will go to the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency and the state's General Fund.57 Supporters argue that the relatively small
recovery available to an aggrieved employee will deter "bounty hunters" from
bringing suits based on minor violations 8  Finally, Chapter 906 gives
proceedings initiated by the agencies under the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency primacy over those brought by aggrieved employees. 9
That is, if one of the agencies has initiated proceedings against the employer, the
aggrieved employee is precluded from doing so himself.
6
0
48. See Jeff Chorney, State Bar Judge Suspends Licenses of 17200 Trio, THE RECORDER, May 22, 2003
(describing one law firm's alleged scheme to abuse their status as private attorney generals).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. ASSEMBLY COMMrr-EE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 7 (July
9, 2003).
52. Broyles Letter, supra note 42.
53. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 7-
8 (July 9, 2003) (distinguishing the Labor Code private attorney general from the Unfair Competition Law
private attorney general).
54. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a), (c) (enacted by Chapter 906).
55. Id.
56. See id. §§ 2699(e)(1)-(2) (setting forth fines of between $100 and $500 for each violation);
ASSEMBLY COMMIEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrIrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 4 (June 26, 2003) (contrasting the
$100 and $500 fines under Chapter 906 to a $25,000 fine set forth under Labor Code section 6428).
57. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(h) (enacted by Chapter 906) (setting forth how civil fines are to be
distributed).
58. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 8 (July
9, 2003).
59. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(h) (enacted by Chapter 906).
60. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
In creating a private right of action6' and attaching nominal civil fine amounts
to all Labor Code violations,62 Chapter 906 provides aggrieved employees with a
viable alternative to the incomplete enforcement of the state's Labor Code.63 The
evidence of inadequate enforcement 6 and the likelihood of budgetary shortfalls
in the foreseeable future
65 warranted a creative solution to a looming problem.
66
While Chapter 906 is a creative solution that does not further strain the state's
budget,67 the true test of its efficacy and prudence will be whether aggrieved
employees and the bar acting as private attorneys general responsibly and
ethically administer its provisions.
61. Id. § 2699(a).
62. See id. § 2699(e)(1)-(2) (assigning a civil penalty to all violations of the Labor Code which did not
formerly have one).
63. See GALLAGHER, supra note 1 (tracking inspection, citation, and penalty statistics over the last thirty
years).
64. Id.
65. See Broder, supra note 28 (describing the state's $38 billion dollar budget deficit).
66. See Rankin Letter, supra note 30 (calling for a "creative solution" to aid in the enforcement of the
Labor Code).
67. Id.

